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SUMMARY
Excess demand is a pervasive feature of health care systems that use global budgets to pay for hospital care,
regardless of the amount of money spent by those systems. This paper presents a theory that explains this feature
of global budgets. The theory emphasizes that hospital administrators control the allocation of their budget, and
that they choose quantity and resource intensity to maximize their own utility. The equilibrium quantity of care
provided may be less than quantity demanded by consumers, leading to excess demand for admissions. An increase
in the hospital’s budget may even be associated with an increase in excess demand. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons,
Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Many countries use global budgets to pay for
hospital care. Canada, Spain and the United
Kingdom (prior to 1991) are examples. Most
global budget systems share two features. The first
feature is a central authority which determines
the budget for each hospital during a stated
period of time, such as 1 year. The central
authority could be the national government or, as
in the case of Canada, 10 provincial and two
territorial public funding systems. Particular pro-
grammes within the health care sector may also
use global hospital budgets. For example, in the
United States, the Veterans Administration pro-
vides hospital care for military veterans through
the use of global budgets. Because it determines
the budget for every hospital in the system, the
central authority controls the total amount spent
on hospital services, as well as the allocation of
funds among hospitals and regions of the country.
This is in contrast to ‘open-ended’ reimbursement
systems such as those that utilize cost reimburse-
ment or fixed payment per admission.
The second feature of global budget systems is
that the hospital has a considerable amount of
discretion over how its budget is spent within each
period. Because the hospital itself exercises this
control, the central authority can absolve itself
from the responsibility of ‘micro-managing’ the
production of patient care. This job is turned over
to professionals who, it is assumed, are better
qualified to determine the optimal quantity and
quality of care and to decide which patients
deserve to receive care. Typically, price plays no
role in this process because hospital care is free
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for all patients covered by the health care systems
of the countries mentioned above.
Although these arguments appear to provide a
powerful justification for global budgets, the
experience of countries utilizing this payment
system is one of excess demand for hospital
services. For example, Naylor1 reported that 1700
per on  were waiting for open heart urgery in
Ontario, Canada, in 1989. This represented more
than 25% of the annual provincial caseload for
open-heart surgery. Waiting times for elective
cases ranged from as little as 4 to 8 weeks in some
centres to 6 months or more in others. Other
comparisons indicate that the waiting time for
knee replacement is longer in Ontario than in the
United States,2 and the waiting time for hip
fracture surgery is longer in Quebec than in
Massachusetts.3
Frankel4 summarized the official data on inpa-
tient waiting lists in the United Kingdom’s
National Health Service. As of 31 March 1991,
about 690 000 people were waiting for some type
of inpatient medical admission. According to
Department of Health figures,5 169 800 of these
people (almost 25% of the total waiting list) had
waited over 1 year for treatment. Of interest to
the hypothesis advanced in this paper, time series
data indicate that the NHS hospital waiting list
has remained remarkably constant since about
1960, when measured as a percentage of total
hospital throughput. This has occurred despite
swings in real funding for the NHS, suggesting
that hospital waiting lists are a persistent charac-
teristic of the NHS, irrespective of the level of
resources devoted to hospital care.
Why is excess demand a pervasive feature of
globally budgeted hospital payment systems?
Pauly6 has suggested that the problem is a generic
one that applies to any public program of ‘free’
medical care. The public, as taxpayers, are not
willing to spend as much money as they demand
in their role as consumers of services. According
to Pauly, the result is chronic under-funding of
free health services. Buchanan7 made a similar
argument which relies on altruism (or the lack of
it) to explain under-funding of public services. As
taxpayers, consumers are asked to vote for a tax
contribution that largely pays for the care of
others. Unless individuals consider the consump-
tion of others to be equally important as their own
consumption, they will not vote to supply as many
hospital services as they demand. Buchanan’s
argument, unlike that of Pauly, does not depend
on the health services being ‘free’ on demand.
However, if the services are free, then the case for
under-funding is strengthened because people will
not value even their own marginal consumption at
its marginal tax cost.
In this paper, we present a theory that explains
why hospitals appear to be chronically under-
funded in systems as different as the United
Kingdom, which spent 6.2% of its Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP) on health care in 1990 and
Canada, which spent 9.3% of GDP on health
care.8 Surprisingly, our theory suggests that an
increase in the amount of money budgeted to a
hospital may even increase the excess demand for
hospital services. This is in contrast to the implica-
tion of Pauly’s and Buchanan’s models, in which
chronic under-funding can be corrected, at least in
principle, by infusing money into the system.
BASIC MODEL OF A GLOBAL BUDGET
FOR A HOSPITAL
Equilibrium in the basic model
In this section we outline a simple economic
model of a hospital in a global budgeting system,
and we show that excess demand may be an
equilibrium of this model. The concept of equilib-
rium refers to a situation in which certain inter-
related variables in a model are selected so that
no tendency to change prevails.9 Our model
focuses on two inter-related variables: the quan-
tity and quality of hospital services. We assume
that hospital administrators select these variables
with the goal of maximizing their own utility,
subject to patients’ demand and the size of the
hospital’s budget. Thus, equilibrium in our model
refers to a combination of quantity and quality
which, once chosen, will not change as long as the
external forces facing the hospital are assumed to
be fixed. However, we will show that this equilib-
rium may not coincide with the quantity and
quality of hospital care that consumers would
prefer for the same global budget.
Our model begins with the assumption that
demand for services at a particular hospital (Qd)
depends on the patients’ price of care at that
hospital (P) and their perceptions of its quality:
Qd = D(P,qc), where qc stands for quality as
perceived by patients. However, in the health
systems analysed in this paper (e.g. Canada and
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the UK), the patients’ price is zero. Consequently,
we hypothesize that the demand for services at a
particular hospital depends entirely on perceived
quality.
Although perceived quality of hospital care is
not observed directly, we suggest that it is
positively related to the intensity of resources
utilized per unit of service (e.g. per admission or
patient-day). The notion that resource intensity
can be used as a proxy for hospital quality was
popularized by Feldstein,10 who proposed to
measure quality as the ratio of an index of
average cost per patient-day to an index of
resource prices. Feldman and Dowd11 measured
quality by the number of specialized facilities and
services and whether the hospital had a teaching
programme. It was found that offering more
services always increased the demand for admis-
sions, especially by Medicare patients. Since
Medicare patients pay a fixed deductible per
hospital stay, they should exhibit quality-sensitive
demand when choosing among hospitals (i.e. they
should prefer the hospital with the highest per-
ceived quality).
The role of perceived quality in explaining
consumers’ hospital choices has attracted the
attention of market researchers,12–15 who con-
sistently find that perceived quality is the most
important attribute in hospital selection. One
study15 showed that perceived hospital quality
could be measured by a valid and reliable scale
composed of 16 indicators. These included, in
addition to a direct perception of ‘quality of
medical care’, items such as the level of technol-
ogy, range of services and hospital size. These
measures all relate to resource intensity.
A final perspective on the relation between
quality and resource intensity has been offered by
Phelps,16 who notes that doctors are an important
input in the production of medical care. A
primary way by which hospitals attract doctors to
their staffs is to provide the capability for doctors
to do things they cannot do elsewhere. This may
include the provision of a cardiac intensive care
unit to attract cardiologists, for example. Doctors
then steer patients toward hospitals that offer
these resource-intensive services. The implication
of this perspective is that doctors can also use
resource intensity as a proxy for hospital quality
even in situations where patients are not well
informed.
On the basis of these studies, we write the
patients’ demand function as Qd = F(R), where R
is the intensity of resource use, and we assume
that F'(R) is positive. Nonetheless, after develop-
ing the basic model, we analyse the case where
patients perceive that the hospital is providing
excessive services [i.e. the demand curve is back-
ward-bending so that F'(R) is negative].
Next, we explain our assumption regarding
hospital decision-makers’ preferences. We assume
that the hospital maximizes a utility function that
depends on quantity of services and quality, as
perceived by the professionals who run the
hospital: U = H(Q,qh), where qh stands for pro-
fessional perceptions of quality. These perceptions
are not observed directly and may differ from
consumers’ perceptions, but like consumers’ per-
ceptions, we assume they are positively related to
observed resource intensity. Because resource
intensity is a proxy for qh, utility can be mapped
into a new function, U = V(Q,R), where qh has
been replaced by R.
To find the equilibrium of our model, we want
to use indifference curves from this new utility
function because it can be drawn in a graph with
the same dimensions (quantity and resource
intensity) as consumer demand. However, indif-
ference curves from the V function may not be
convex to the origin, in which case the usual
tangency condition for equilibrium would not
apply to our model. In the Appendix, we derive a
twofold sufficient condition for convexity of
indifference curves from V: (1) indifference curves
from the underlying utility function, H(Q,qh), are
convex; and (2) increasing the level of resource
intensity results in a proportionately equal or
lesser increase in professional perceptions of
quality (i.e. the relation between resource inten-
sity and perceived quality displays constant or
decreasing returns). Since these are reasonable
assumptions, we will draw the indifference curves
from V as convex to the origin of a graph whose
dimensions are quantity and resource intensity.
The next element of our model is the hospital’s
budget constraint. In a global budget system, the
hospital’s budget is B = RQ, where B is assumed
to be determined exogenously by the central
authority. After presenting the basic model, we
will consider refinements in which future budgets
depend, at least in part, on current actions taken
by the hospital.
The hospital is assumed to maximize utility,
subject to the budget constraint. This is a standard
Kuhn–Tucker problem, which can be represented
as maximizing the Lagrangian function:
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L = V(Q,R) + ì(B – RQ) + ç[F(R)–Q] (1)
The first-order conditions for utility maximization
are given by
¶ L
¶ Q
= VQ – ìR – ç ≤ 0, Q ‡ 0, Q
¶ L
¶ Q
= 0 (2a)
¶ L
¶ R
= VR – ìQ – çFR ≤ 0, R ‡ 0, R
¶ L
¶ R
= 0 (2b)
¶ L
¶ ì
= B – RQ ‡ 0, ì ‡ 0,  ì
¶ L
¶ ì
= 0 (2c)
¶ L
¶ ç
= F(R) – Q ‡ 0, ç ‡ 0,  ç
¶ L
¶ ç
= 0 (2d)
We will assume that both decision variables (Q
and R) are strictly positive, which implies that the
respective partial derivatives of the Langrangian
function (2a and 2b) are zero. This equilibrium for
the model is shown in Fig. 1. Assuming that Q and
R are strictly positive implies that the utility
function V(Q,R) is more convex that the budget
constraint, which is indicated by the rectangular
hyperbola B0 in Fig. 1.
Next, consider the conditions governing ì and
ç:
(i) Suppose ì = 0: then ç must be positive to make
equation (2a) equal zero, but ç must be
negative to make equation (2b) equal zero.
This is a contradiction, so ì > 0. This implies,
by equation (2c), that the hospital’s budget
constraint is binding.
(ii) Suppose ç = 0: in this case we can solve
equations (2a) and (2b) to obtain VQ/VR = R/
Q. Condition (2d) implies that F(R) – Q ‡ 0.
The assumption that ç = 0 means that patients’
demand is not binding; therefore, hospital admin-
istrators can choose quantity and quality as they
wish, subject only to the size of their budget.
Equilibrium occurs where an indifference curve
from V, labelled V0, is tangent to the budget
constraint. Since this occurs to the left of the
intersection of the budget constraint and the
demand curve, there is excess demand for serv-
Figure 1. Excess demand for hospital services in a global budget payment system.
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ices, measured by the horizontal distance (Qd – Q)
in Fig. 1.
A unique feature of this model is that the
demand curve Qd is upward-sloping. This appears
to violate the economic law that demand curves
for non-Giffen goods slope downward. However,
it is important to remember that the vertical axis
of Fig. 1 represents resource intensity (a proxy
measure of quality), not the price of hospital care.
The demand for hospital admissions should
increase as the quality of services increases. In the
usual graph of demand as a relation between price
and quantity, the demand curve would appear to
shift to the right when quality increases.
It is possible that ç = 0 simultaneously with
F(R) = Q (i.e. the patient demand constraint is
not binding but there is no excess demand).
Graphically, this would be a corner solution
where V0 is tangent to the budget constraint
precisely where Qd crosses the budget constraint
in Fig. 1.
(iii) Suppose ç > 0: in this case condition (2d)
implies that F(R) – Q = 0 (i.e. there is no
excess demand). Conditions (2a) and (2b) can
be solved to obtain
VQ
VR
=
R
Q
(1 + çFR
VR
+
çQ
RVR
) > R
Q
The assumption that ç > 0 means that patients’
demand is binding. This equilibrium can be
interpreted with reference to the original situa-
tion shown in Fig. 1. Imagine that a different
hospital, facing the same demand curve and the
same global budget, wants to stretch that budget
toward more quantity and less quality. Tangency
between one of the hospital’s indifference curves
and B0 may occur to the right of the intersection
between B0 and Qd. However, patients would find
this level of quality unacceptably low, so they
would not demand as much care as the hospital
wants to produce. The result would be under-
utilization of the hospital’s budget and less utility
than the hospital could achieve by increasing the
quality of care. The best possible combination of
quality and quantity for the hospital under these
new assumptions would occur at the intersection
of B0 and Qd.
There is a wide variety of utility functions that
will lead to an equilibrium of the type just
described (a corner solution at Q = Qd, with both
constraints binding, and no tangency at the
equilibrium). This implies that excess demand is
not always the equilibrium solution to our model.
Nevertheless, we believe that administrators and
patients would be at odds in this corner solution.
The administrators would like to provide high
volume and low quality, but patients would not
willingly utilize this amount of low-quality care.
Hospital response to an exogenous budget
increase
As explained above, our model predicts that
equilibrium with excess demand will always occur
when the hospital’s marginal rate of substitution is
strictly less than the slope of the budget constraint
at the point where F(R) crosses the budget
constraint. In this section, we show that excess
demand may increase following an exogenous
increase in the hospital’s budget, and we derive
the condition under which this ‘perverse’ response
will occur.
By definition, excess demand is (Qd – Q), so
excess demand will increase as B increases if
¶ (Qd – Q)
¶ B
=
¶ Qd
¶ R
¶ R
¶ B
–
¶ Qd
¶ B
> 0 (3)
Next, totally differentiating the budget
constraint:
1 = R
¶ Q
¶ B
+ Q
¶ R
¶ B
(4)
Substituting equation (4) into equation (3), we
can rewrite the resulting formula in elasticity
notion as
å <
Ł
(Q/Qd) + Ł
(5)
where å is the hospital’s elasticity of supply of
services with respect to the budget and Ł is the
consumers’ elasticity of demand for services with
respect to resource intensity.
Suppose that the initial equilibrium involves a
perfect balance between supply and demand (i.e.
Q/Qd = 1.0). Then, any supply response less than
Ł/(1 + Ł) will be insufficient to satisfy the
increased demand for services. For example, if
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Q/Qd = 1.0 and Ł = 1.0, then an increase in the
hospital’s budget will result in more excess
demand if the elasticity of supply is less than 0.5.
In the extreme case where demand is infinitely
elastic, excess demand will increase if the elas-
ticity of supply is less than 1.0. In other words,
when demand is infinitely responsive to quality,
the increase in the hospital’s budget must be spent
entirely on more services or else excess demand
will increase.
Now, suppose we start from an initial position
where excess demand is already present. In this
case, the condition for preventing an increase in
the hospital’s budget from worsening the excess
demand situation is even more stringent. For
example, suppose that the initial position is
Q/Qd = 0.5 and Ł = 1.0. Then, any supply elas-
ticity less than 0.67 will cause excess demand to
increase. The intuition behind this result is that an
increase in demand will out-pace a proportionate
increase in supply when the initial level of
demand exceeds supply. Thus, supply must expand
by a larger proportion in order to ‘stay even’ with
the increase in demand.
An alternative explanation of equation (5) is
that excess demand increases with increases in the
budget when the hospital’s income expansion
path is steeper than the F(R) function. For
example, ¶ (Qd – Q)/¶ B is greater than zero if Q is
an inferior good to the hospital and is less than
zero if R is an inferior good to the hospital.
Finally, if both goods are normal, excess demand
could increase or decrease with an increase in the
budget depending on the relative strength of the
two income effects and the slope of the F(R)
function.
Our comparative statics analysis implies that
persistent excess demand is a pervasive feature of
health care systems that use global budgets to pay
for hospital care, regardless of the amount of
money spent by those systems. This outcome is
shown in Fig. 1 by the budget constraint labeled
B1. Although B1 represents a larger budget than
B0, hospital decision-makers have used the addi-
tional funds to finance a substantial increase in
resource intensity, which has caused excess
demand to increase. The income expansion path
from V0 to the new equilibrium on V1 is clearly
steeper than the slope of the F(R) function in this
example.
EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC MODEL
Endogenous hospital budgets
Our assumption that hospitals’ budgets are deter-
mined exogenously may be unrealistic. In prac-
tice, the central authority may monitor some
indicators of hospital performance in the current
period, and it may base the budget for next
period, in part, on these indicators. Hospitals in
the Spanish National Health System, for example,
are budgeted on the basis of standardized patient
days known by the acronym UPA.17 The hospital
submits its proposed UPAs for the next year to
the Ministry of Health. Its budget for the next
year is based on a negotiated average of the
proposed UPAs and its actual UPAs for the
current year, times a standard rate per UPA. In
practice, the budget tends to be very close to the
current UPA workload times the standard rate.
We can represent this endogenous budget-
setting process by the equation Bt+1 = QtS, where
the subscripts stand for time periods and S
(without a subscript) is the standard rate set by
the central authority. The central authority might
also update S. For example, S could be increased
by a specific percentage of the economy’s inflation
rate. For simplicity, we assume that S is
constant.
The hospital is now subjected to a multi-period
optimization problem, since the budget for next
year depends on its allocation of the current
budget between output and resource intensity. A
typical equilibrium condition for this optimization
is
VQ,t
VS,t
=
S
Qt
– ä( VS,t+1
VS,t
) ( S
Qt+1
) (6)
The left-hand side of equation (6) is the slope of a
hospital indifference curve in the current time
period. The first term on the right-hand side is the
slope of the current-period budget constraint. The
second right-hand side term has three parts: ä
(assumed to be ≤ 1) is the discount rate used by
the hospital, VS,t+1/VS,t is the ratio of the marginal
utilities of resource intensity in the current period
and the next period and S/Qt+1 is the marginal
future return from reducing resource intensity in
the current period. Multiplied together, these
three parts represent the discounted rate of return
(i.e. the reward in terms of future budget
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increases) for reducing current resource
intensity.
Naylor1 used the phrase ‘fiscal envelope’ to
describe the hospital’s global budget constraint.
This is an apt metaphor for the hospital with an
endogenous hospital. Although the hospital could
push its current resource intensity to the edge of
the envelope, it has an incentive not to do so
because this would adversely affect next year’s
budget. The prospect of future budget increases
therefore provides an incentive for the hospital to
hold resource intensity below the level it would
choose in a single-period model.
To continue with the example of the Spanish
hospital system, if the hospital serves more than
the planned number of patients, or the cost per
UPA is higher than anticipated, in principle the
hospital does not receive additional resources.
However, in practice, the hospital always tries to
negotiate additional money if it needs it. This type
of ‘after-the-fact’ adjustment may cause the hospi-
tal’s actual budget to differ somewhat from the
pure fiscal envelope suggested by our model.
Backward-bending patient demand
We have assumed that patients view more
resource intensity as being associated with higher
quality. Is this assumption pivotal in driving the
excess demand results? To answer this question,
we extend the model to the case where patient
demand is backward-bending (i.e. increases in
resource intensity are perceived as reducing
quality on the margin). The first-order conditions
from our basic model [equations (2a)–(2d)] still
apply in this case. However, the interpretation of
these conditions becomes more complex. In the
basic model, the hospital’s budget constraint
always was binding (ì > 0), and excess demand
was the expected result. In the extended model,
however, it is no longer contradictory to suppose
that ì = 0, as shown by the following analysis:
Suppose ì = 0: conditions (2a) and (2b) both
imply that ç > 0. These conditions can be solved
to obtain VQ/VR = R/Q. Condition (2d) implies
that consumer demand is binding.
This equilibrium is shown in Fig. 2, where the
backward-bending demand curve Qd cuts the
hospital’s budget at two points labeled Æ and â.
The demand curve is tangent to a hospital
indifference curve in the region above and to the
left of â. In other words, the consumer demand
constraint is binding but the hospital does not
utilize its entire budget. This equilibrium would
be associated with excess supply of hospital care:
at the end of the budget period, hospital admin-
istrators would refund part of their budget to the
central health authority. While the intuition that
such refunds should not occur is fairly strong,
National Health Systems managers are becoming
very sophisticated and this behaviour might be
possible in the future.
LINK BETWEEN EXCESS DEMAND AND
WAITING LISTS
In a market, excess demand is cleared through a
rise in price. However, the systems which we are
analysing provide hospital care free for all
patients covered. Pauly6 maintained that the
absence of prices in medical care markets leads to
a generic problem of excess demand. Buchanan7
blamed the chronic NHS funding deficiency on
the absence of prices, maintaining that patient
demand will persistently outpace supply in this
situation. We concur with this analysis but we
want to go further than Pauly and Buchanan.
With zero prices and scarce resources, non-
market mechanisms to allocate resources have to
be implemented. Specifically, we want to discuss
the relation and the consequences of two such
mechanisms that happen to be implemented
together in some countries: global budgets and
waiting lists.
In more general terms, global budgets are one
form of centralized decision taken by the author-
ities as opposed to decentralized decisions arrived
at by the price system. Global budgets are not a
necessary consequence of universal coverage —
other ways to finance hospitals are common. In
this very general setting even the endogenous
Spanish budgeting discussed in the paper is a form
of centralized decision making, as indicators are
defined and decided centrally, although the partic-
ipation of individual hospitals is obviously
greater.
At the micro level, hospitals may allocate their
global budget in different ways. Queuing and
waiting, with patients classified by seriousness and
urgency and with throughput and time as the main
variables, is not the only one. Instead of waiting
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lists on a first-come, first-served basis, hospitals
could use lotteries to match supply and demand.
More realistically, they may turn to some kind of
centralized decision making, but now at the
hospital level, that is, giving doctors the power to
select among patients with the same condition
and equal urgency, which ones are to be treated
first. One such criterion may be age, with younger
patients preferred first; another may be the
personal interests of the doctors, as may be the
case when they give preference to an important
politician or to the relatives of their colleagues.
No doubt a mixture of these ‘methods’ is to be
found in reality. We give preference to waiting
lists.
Strictly, the existence of a waiting list is not
sufficient to conclude that excess demand exists.
For example, people wait for new cars to be
delivered and there are waiting lists for tickets to
entertainment events. These lists could represent
producers’ desires to avoid holding an excess
inventory, or consumers’ desires to plan ahead in
order to consume the good at a particular time.
However, given the length of waiting lists asso-
ciated with some medical services, it is unlikely
that waiting reflects rational planning to avoid
excess capacity or to ensure consumption at a
certain time. For example, half of the patients who
underwent coronary artery bypass graft surgery
(CABGS) in Toronto in 1989 had waiting times
above the maximum indicated by medical urgency
criteria.18 Several widely publicized deaths
occurred among patients who had suffered multi-
ple waits and long cancellations.1
This evidence clearly indicates a link between
excess demand and waiting lists in the countries
mentioned in this paper. When demand is greater
than supply, at least some patients are likely to be
added to a list. However, the link between excess
demand and the dynamics of waiting lists is less
clear from our model. To illustrate this point, the
model does not predict how long the waiting line
will be for a given level of excess demand. This
requires additional specification of the prefer-
ences of consumers and providers. Lindsay and
Feigenbaum,19 for example, pointed out that the
waiting list will grow until the value of future
consumption is equal to the cost of entering the
Figure 2. Equilibrium when patient demand is backward-bending.
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queue for the last person to enter. Systemic
differences in preferences for current use in
relation to future use must be taken into account
in explaining the length of the hospital waiting
list. At a more detailed level, waiting times might
be measured separately for patients with different
acuity levels. As Naylor1 notes, patients with
urgent conditions may be treated quickly, even in
a system with long average waiting times.
Another dynamic question that our model
cannot answer is whether the waiting list will
increase or decrease when the hospital’s budget
increases. The evidence appears to be ambiguous
on this matter. After the Ontario provincial
government launched a programme to increase
the capacity of open-heart surgery by 800 cases
per year (12% of the annual caseload), both the
total waiting list and the average wait for elective
surgery declined.1 On the other hand, Harley20
failed to detect any relationships between waiting
times for trauma and orthopaedic surgery and a
number of district-level measures of resource
availability in the UK NHS. This finding is in
agreement with our earlier observation that hos-
pital waiting lists seem to be invariant with swings
in real funding for the NHS.
In fact, these Canadian and UK findings may
not be inconsistent when the circumstances sur-
rounding the resource expansions are fully
detailed. In Ontario, the provincial authorities
expanded hospital capacity in a specific area,
effectively pre-empting the hospitals’ authority to
allocate the extra funds away from coronary
surgery. This was not the case in the UK data,
where the budget was controlled at a micro level
by the hospitals. It is not surprising that the
patterns of resource allocation are different when
the central authority attaches some strings to the
global budget.
CONCLUSION
We have presented a model of a hospital in a
global budget payment system. Patients were
assumed to pay no user price for hospital services.
Consequently, demand depends entirely upon
patients’ perceptions of hospital quality which in
turn are driven by the resource intensity of
services. The allocation of the hospital’s budget
between quantity and resource intensity is con-
trolled by the administrators, who maximize their
own utility function. We showed that excess
demand for hospital services is typical of equilib-
rium in this model. Furthermore, an increase in
the hospital’s budget can lead to an increase in
excess demand under plausible assumptions
regarding the elasticities of demand and supply.
APPENDIX
Indifference curves between resource intensity
(R) and quantity (Q)
The hospital’s utility function can be written as
U = H[Q,qh (R)], where qh is a function of
resource intensity. We assume that qh'(R) > 0.
The slope of an indifference curve is
¶ R
¶ Q
= –
HQ
Hqhq'h
(A1)
The rate of change in the slope with respect to a
change in Q is
¶
2R
¶ Q2
=
– HQQH
2
qh + 2HQqhHQHqh – HqhqhHQ
2
Hqh
2q'h
–
qh
''HQ
2
Hqh
2 qh
' 3
(A2)
The first term in equation (A2) is the curvature of
an ‘ordinary’ indifference curve between quality
and quantity, multiplied by 1/qh'. Since we assume
that qh' > 0, the first term is positive provided that
ordinary indifference curves are convex. The
second term in equation (A2) will be zero or
negative if the quality function has constant or
decreasing returns (i.e. if qh" ≤ 0). Thus, the
assumptions that qh' > 0,qh" ≤ 0 and convexity of
ordinary indifference curves are sufficient to show
that indifference curves between quantity and
resource intensity are convex.
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